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associated to [sic] rents; labour market institutions interact with personnel policies. Notably, wages are 
partly set outside the firm-worker pair (minimum wages and collective agreements are widespread)" and 
"job termination policies are affected by a sizeable and binding employment protection legislation." This is 
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of what the government does on the economic 
front, the poor performance of these diverse gov-
ernment interventions constitutes a substantial 
drag on economic growth. Second, as Winston's 
thorough critique makes clear, empirical evi-
dence on the performance of government poli-
cies provides a sounder guidance for structuring 
our policy approach than the ideological argu-
ments that often dominate such debates. Popular 
commentators and economists engaged in policy 
debates would benefit from drawing on the 
empirical lessons regarding the performance of 
policies to address purported market failures 
rather than assuming that all government policies 
will be effective, regardless of how ill-conceived 
or mismanaged these policies might be. Instead 
of relying on ideology, Winston's book provides a 
framework for refraining current policy debates 
in an empirically based, scientific manner. Third, 
Government Failure versus Market Failure high-
lights policy areas where more empirical research 
is needed. Winston's excellent volume concludes 
with a compelling general plea for more policy-
oriented economics research. 
Even if some well intentioned policymakers are 
armed with the wealth of case studies document-
ed in this book, they will find that bad govern-
ment policies are difficult to alter. Once policies 
are in place, constituencies in favor of the status 
quo resist change. For example, once companies 
have complied with costly government regula-
tions, drey often want those requirements to con-
tinue as a barrier to the entry of competitors. 
Reform is much more likely to be successful in 
altering new initiatives on the policy agenda. 
Reform advocates will find in this book a man-
ageable checklist of economic insights to apply to 
policy design. Winston's policy recommendations 
draw on mainstream economic principles, com-
bined with a keen empirical sense of the types of 
policies that have proven to be successful. He 
advocates efficiency tests*for antitrust policies, 
opposes agricultural price supports and quotas, 
supports deregulation in many economic regula-
tion contexts, and supports emissions trading to 
address environmental externalities. Advocates of 
current failed government policies are usually 
well aware of these more efficient policy-
approaches. But die concerns that drive policy 
often bear little relation to die naive and hopeful 
notion that the government maximizes social wel-
fare. Although reforming government policy will 
not be a simple task, economists and policymak-
ers who are searching for ways to improve social 
welfare will find this book to be a valuable start-
ing point. 
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Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour 
Markets. By Pietro Garibaldi. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. xvii, 
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This book is an attempt to consolidate what we 
know about Personnel Economics by focusing on 
Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor Markets. 
Even on the first page of the book, the author is 
clear about this mission. In particular he notes 
that "The view of personnel economics analyzed 
in this book is based on two key properties 
of... labour markets: labour markets are imper-
fect and jobs are associated to [sic] rents; labour 
market institutions interact with personnel poli-
cies. Notably, wages are partly set outside the 
firm-worker pair (minimum wages and collective 
agreements are widespread)" and "job termina-
tion policies are affected by a sizeable and binding 
employment protection legislation." This is a wor-
tiiy goal and the idea for writing a book that focus-
es on imperfect labor markets is a very good one. 
The book contains tiiirteen chapters. In die first, 
"Personnel Economics and Non-Competitive 
Labour Markets," the author outlines the book 
by nicely describing that market imperfections 
create some interesting complications in per-
sonnel economics that are absent in perfect 
labor markets. This includes some motivation 
with basic statistics from the OECD on differ-
ences in union density and employment protec-
tion legislation in a set of six countries and the 
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European Union. The second chapter, "The 
Optimal Skill Ratio," discusses two main issues: 
the hours/employment trade-off and the skill 
composition of the labor force. This introduces 
ideas of isocost lines and isoquant curves and a bit 
of calculus. It also describes the idea of wage com-
pression and introduces some data across five 
countries. Chapter 3, "The Hours-Employment 
Tradeoff," includes a detailed discussion of the 
difference between variable and fixed costs and 
derives a formal solution to the employment-
hours trade-off. It goes on to show, from a dreo-
retical point of view, what might happen in the 
presence of an overtime premium and the poten-
tial effects of reducing the workweek. The chap-
ter ends with a nice discussion of the reduction of 
the workweek in France in 1982. 
Chapter 4, "Temporary or Permanent?," is a 
discussion of trade-offs between open-ended and 
fixed-term contracts. In particular, the chapter 
examines three separate issues. First is firm 
choice of either temporary or permanent con-
tracts. Second is combining temporary and per-
manent contracts. Finally, the author examines 
hiring a temporary worker and using a temporary 
help firm as an intermediary. The chapter ends 
with some data from the OECD on the incidence 
of temporary workers by country over time. In 
chapter 5, "Selection in Recruiting," the author 
discusses contingent contracts, signaling, and the 
simple schooling model. 
The next three chapters concern compensa-
tion. Chapter 6 is titled "Optimal Compensation 
Schemes: Foundation." This chapter introduces 
concepts of indifference curves and examines a 
simple principal-agent model, makes compar-
isons between risk-neutral and risk-averse agents, 
and sets the groundwork for subsequent chap-
ters. In chapter 7, "Pay for Performance with 
Wage Constraints," the author introduces the 
idea of workers with heterogeneous abilities. This 
chapter also describes performance pay with a 
two-tiered wage system and Edward P. Lazears 
(2000) Safelite Glass example of one firm switch-
ing from salaries to piece rates. The third com-
pensation chapter (chapter 8), "Relative 
Compensation and Efficiency Wage," introduces 
additional ideas such as tournament theory and 
efficiency wages. 
Chapters 9 and 10 focus on training. Chapter 9, 
"Training and Human Capital Investment," intro-
duces the ideas of benefits and costs of education, 
discounting, and general versus specific capital. 
Chapter 10, "Training Investment in Imperfect 
Labor Markets," builds on chapter 9 by consider-
ing firm-sponsored training with specific focus on 
the temporary help industry. 
In "Job Destruction" (chapter 11), the author 
covers issues of "firm-initiated" separations 
(including a discussion of wage cuts), imperfect 
labor markets, labor hoarding, and the effects of 
"firing taxes." Chapter 12, "Further Issues in 
Employment Protection Legislation," examines 
employment protection legislation including 
taxes and transfers. The book concludes with a 
chapter on "Teams and Group Incentives." This 
includes a discussion of the "one over N prob-
lem," remedies for compensating teams, and an 
example from a firm called Koret, in the garment 
manufacturing industry that changed its compen-
sation scheme from individual piece rates to 
group piece rates. This is based on a paper by 
Barton H. Hamilton, Jack As Nickerson, and 
Hideo Owan (2003). 
If this were the only book that a newcomer to 
the field were to read about Personnel 
Economics, there is quite a lot of value added 
within the pages. However, there are a number 
of things that surprised me about the book. I 
expected the book to cover more new ground. 
There is quite a bit of overlap with Lazear (1995), 
Lazear (1998), and a set of undergraduate labor 
economics textbooks such as Ronald G. 
Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith (2006) and 
George Borjas (2004). Garibaldis book seems 
written on roughly the same level as the others. 
It uses some calculus and is more theoretical 
than Lazear (1998), Ehrenberg and Smith 
(2006), or Borjas (2004), although it is less tech-
nical than Lazear (1995). It is also written from a 
European perspective, and it is this last bit that 
sets it apart most. 
The book reads less like a book than like an 
effective set of (mostly) independent lectures. 
There are few transitions between chapters. A 
particularly stark example of this occurs at the 
start of chapter 11 (p. 187). After just having 
completed a discussion of training in imperfect 
labor markets, the author jumps straight into a 
chapter on "Job Destruction." Both subjects are 
important and worthy of discussion. However, a 
connection between these chapters would 
improve the book. There are few individual con-
clusions to chapters, many of which end quite 
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abruptly. The book also lacks a concluding section 
to tie everything together. 
Given the title of the book and its introduction, 
I was expecting more of a focus on imperfect 
labor markets. Chapter 1 nicely outlines some of 
the potential imperfections in the labor market, 
such as minimum wage legislation, union density, 
and employment protection legislation. Given 
that the author is employed by a European uni-
versity, I expected to see a steady diet of "imper-
fection details." In fact, many of the chapters, 
although nicely done, were largely about 
Personnel Economics in perfect labor markets. 
The main chapters on compensation (6-8) are 
largely standard discussions of the economics of 
personnel. This is also true of the first chapter on 
training and human capital investment, chapter .9. 
While the book does a fine job covering theo-
retical ideas, I expected more new empirical 
examples. Some of those examples, e.g., Lazear's 
(2000) classic on Safelite Glass, are very good. 
There are other places where the text would 
have benefited from a more detailed discussion 
of well-known literature. For example, in chap-
ter 5 during the discussion of productivity versus 
signaling models of education (p. 80), some of 
the empirical literature in this area could have 
been mentioned (e.g., Thomas Hungerford and 
Gary Solon 1987 and Kevin Lang and David 
Kropp 1986). 
I also thought that most of the chapters would 
be improved by more citations, although chapter 
11, "Job Destruction," is a counterexample in 
that it has many nice citations. An example 
appears in chapter 1 during the discussion of the 
minimum wage (p. 6) as a classic imperfection in 
the labor market. There is not a single citation to 
the vast literature on the minimum wage. 
Another example appears in the section on tour-
naments (pp. 133-51), where there is no citation 
to two classics in the field (Lazear and Sherwin 
Rosen 1981 and Rosen 1986). Further, in several 
instances, even when specific previous work is 
discussed, the proper citations are not always 
provided. One example is in the discussion of 
Safelite Glass (pp. 121-22) where Lazear (2000) 
is listed in the footnotes to two tables but never, 
as far as I know, in the text. This is also true in the 
discussion of teams in the Koret garment case 
(pp. 223-31). Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 
(2003) is listed in the references on page 243, but 
this paper is never mentioned in the text, even 
though the author devotes nine pages to the 
paper. In a discussion of nonrecurring fixed costs, 
we are told "The best estimate of these cost is the 
one obtained with Israeli data, and shows that the 
typical hiring costs is approximately two weeks of 
paid salary" (p. 28). This is a perfect spot for a 
citation, though none is provided. 
I thought the book could have profited from 
some careful editing. This never really made any 
of the arguments incorrect, but it was frustrat-
ing. An example occurs on page 2 where we are 
told "sections 1.2 and 1.3 briefly discuss the 
nature of the labor market institutions." In fact, 
this discussion appears not in sections 1.2 and 
1.3 but in sections 1.3 and 1.4. Another example 
occurs on page 20 where the author refers to the 
"top panel" of figure 2.4. In fact, there is no top 
panel but only right and left panels. Other 
examples include things like "We now analyze in 
some details the idea . . . " (p. 74) or "which we 
assume to be described by this simply relation-
ships" (p. 75). In the description of wage com-
pression, there is a nice table detailing "wage 
productivity premia in different countries"(p. 
21). However, the author provides neither the 
data source nor the years. There are also a few 
instances where, instead of writing "chapter" or 
"book" the word "report" (p. 203) appears, as if 
these chapters have been cobbled together 
from other sources. Hamilton, Nickerson, and 
Owan (2003) is listed in the references under 
the first author's first name "Barton," instead of 
his last. George Baker is listed as the only 
author of the well-known Baker, Michael Gibbs, 
and Bengt Holmstrom (1994) paper on page 
242. The preface (p. ix) claims there are four-
teen chapters and there are only thirteen! These 
and related problems may have occurred 
between writing and printing the book but 
could have been easily avoided with a careful 
reading. 
Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labor 
Markets is not perfect. I think it could use more 
careful editing, more examples, more emphasis 
on imperfections in the labor market, more tran-
sitions and better writing, and more institutional 
detail. On the other hand, it is an up-to-date 
introduction to Personnel Economics and is a 
useful introduction to many of the main ideas in 
the field. Those interested in moving into or 
learning about Personnel Economics should add 
it to their reading list. 
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Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making 
of the Greatest Generation. By Suzanne 
Mettler. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. Pp. xvi, 252. $30.00. 
ISBN 978-0-19-518097-8. JEL 2007-0228 
The generation of Americans born in the 
1910s and 1920s, who grew up during the Great 
Depression and came of age during World War 
II, has been noted for it's members' high levels 
of civic involvement. Sometimes even referred 
to as the "civic generation," these men and 
women epitomized the ideals of American 
democracy through their intense involvement in 
politics and civic organizations during the post-
war era. What made this generation different 
from more recent generations who are more dis-
engaged from public life? To what extent was 
this generation's commitment to the public good 
shaped by their experiences of the G.I. Bill? 
These questions are the focus of an intriguing 
new book by Suzanne Mettler. 
In order to address these questions, Mettler 
has extensively surveyed over fifteen hundred 
members of the World War II generation, and 
conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-
eight of them. Her efforts culminate in a central 
thesis: that the G.I. Bill had an overwhelmingly 
positive effect on veterans' civic involvement 
and that this effect was due to more than the 
bill's impact on individuals' educational attain-
ment. In particular, much of the program's 
power lay in its inclusiveness, its generosity, and 
the rules and procedures by which it was 
administered. 
The G.I. Bill is widely regarded as one of the 
most significant education policies to have taken 
place in modern America. Signed into law on 
June 22, 1944, it provided unprecedented educa-
tional aid to all returning veterans who had 
served for at least ninety days or had been dis-
charged early because of disabilities acquired 
during service. Most veterans were eligible for all 
four years of benefits, provided they began their 
schooling before July 1951. Since the conscrip-
tion rates of (male) cohorts who came of age dur-
ing World War II were near 80 percent, the vast 
majority of men who were in their early twenties 
at the war's end were entitled to G.I. benefits. 
The bill also made very generous financial provi-
sions, providing full tuition, books, and supplies 
toward virtually any institution of higher educa-
tion in the country, as well as a monthly stipend 
that varied by family size. Previous studies have 
estimated that this cash allowance was worth 
50-70 percent of the opportunity cost of not 
working. 
The program's inclusiveness and generosity 
made a strong impression on the men and 
women whom Mettler interviewed. They also 
stand in contrast to many of todays social pro-
grams, which are more narrowly targeted and 
have experienced real declines in value. 
Examples of such programs include the mini-
mum wage, food stamps, cash welfare, Pell 
grants, and unemployment insurance. Previous 
researchers have argued that individuals' atti-
tudes about government and their participation 
in the political system are affected by their expe-
rience of social programs, and that the level of 
resources that are distributed 
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